

Cryptographic Protocols


Spring 2017

Part 4

Guillou-Quisquater – One Round of the Protocol

Setting: m is an RSA-Modulus.

Goal: Prove knowledge of an e -th root of a given $z \in \mathbb{Z}_m^*$.



One-Way Group Homomorphisms (OWGH)

Setting: Groups $\langle G, \star \rangle$ and $\langle H, \otimes \rangle$

Definition: A **group homomorphism** is a function f with:

$$f : G \rightarrow H, \quad f(a \star b) = f(a) \otimes f(b)$$

Notation: We write $[a]$ for $f(a)$, hence

$$[] : G \rightarrow H, \quad [a \star b] = [a] \otimes [b]$$

Examples


cyclic group gen. by h

- $G = \langle \mathbb{Z}_q, + \rangle, H = \langle h \rangle$ with $|H| = q, [a] = h^a$:
 $\rightarrow [a + b] = h^{a+b} = h^a \cdot h^b = [a] \cdot [b]$
- $G = H = \langle \mathbb{Z}_m, \cdot \rangle, [a] = a^e$:
 $\rightarrow [a \cdot b] = (a \cdot b)^e = a^e \cdot b^e = [a] \cdot [b]$.

PoK of Pre-Image of OWGH – One Round of the Protocol

Setting: Groups G and H , group homomorphism $[] : \langle G, \star \rangle \mapsto \langle H, \otimes \rangle$.

Goal: Prove knowledge of pre-image of $z \in H$.



Knowledge Extractor of OWGH PoK

Theorem 1.5: Protocol round is 2-extractable if

$$\exists \ell \in \mathbb{Z}, u \in G \text{ s.t. } (1) \forall c_1, c_2 \in \mathcal{C}, c_1 \neq c_2 : \gcd(c_1 - c_2, \ell) = 1$$

$$(2) [u] = z^\ell$$

Proof: Given accepting conversations $(t, c_1, r_1), (t, c_2, r_2)$ with $c_1 \neq c_2$, and ℓ, u as above. Extract pre-image x' with $[x'] = z$ as follows:

- $$\begin{aligned} [r_1] &= t \otimes z^{c_1} \\ [r_2] &= t \otimes z^{c_2} \\ \hline [r_1 \star r_2^{-1}] &= z^{c_1 - c_2} \end{aligned}$$
- Extended Euclidean Algorithm $\Rightarrow a, b$ s.t. $a\ell + b(c_1 - c_2) = 1$
- $$z = z^1 = z^{a\ell + b(c_1 - c_2)} = z^{a\ell} \otimes z^{b(c_1 - c_2)}$$

$$= (z^\ell)^a \otimes (z^{c_1 - c_2})^b = [u]^a \otimes [r_1 \star r_2^{-1}]^b = \underbrace{[u^a \star (r_1 \star r_2^{-1})^b]}_{x'}$$

OWGH PoK for Schnorr and Guillou-Quisquater

Schnorr

- $G = \mathbb{Z}_q$, cyclic group $H = \langle h \rangle, |H| = q$ prime
- $[] : G \rightarrow H, x \mapsto [x] = h^x$.
- Thm 1.5: $\ell = q, u = 0: z^\ell = 1 = [0]; q$ prime $\Rightarrow \gcd(c_1 - c_2, \ell) = 1$.


Guillou-Quisquater

- $G = H = \mathbb{Z}_m^*$.
- $[] : G \rightarrow H, x \mapsto [x] = x^e$.
- Thm 1.5: $\ell = e, u = z: z^\ell = z^e = [z]; e$ prime $\Rightarrow \gcd(c_1 - c_2, \ell) = 1$.

Further Examples


- \rightarrow Script

Hamiltonian Cycles



0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1

Hamiltonian Cycles — Protocol Idea



Hamiltonian Cycles — One Round of the Protocol

Peggy

Vic

knows HC in \mathcal{G}

knows \mathcal{G}

π at rand., $\mathcal{H} = \pi \mathcal{G} \pi^{-1}$

Commit $\mathcal{H} \rightarrow C_1, \dots, C_{n^2}$

$\xrightarrow{C_1, \dots, C_{n^2}}$

$\xleftarrow{c} c \in_R \{0, 1\}$

$c = 0$: Decommit \mathcal{H}

$\xrightarrow{\pi, d_1, \dots, d_{n^2}} \mathcal{H} \stackrel{?}{=} \pi \mathcal{G} \pi^{-1}$

$c = 1$: Decommit HC

$\xrightarrow{d_{I_1}, \dots, d_{I_n}} d_{I_1}, \dots, d_{I_n} \stackrel{?}{=} \text{HC}$

Commitment Schemes

Name	Setup	Value	Commit	Type	Comments
GI	G_0, G_1 $G_1 = \sigma G_0 \sigma^{-1}$	$x \in \{0, 1\}$	$B = \pi G_x \pi^{-1}$	H	Trapdoor: σ
DL	$ H = q$ $H = \langle h \rangle$	$x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$	$b = h^x$	B	OR: $\text{LSB}(x)$
Pedersen	$ H = q$ $H = \langle g \rangle = \langle h \rangle$	$x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$	$b = g^x h^r$	H	Trapdoor $\text{DL}_{g,h}$
QR B	$m = pq$, $t \in \text{QNR}$, $\left(\frac{t}{m}\right) = 1$	$x \in \{0, 1\}$	$b = r^2 t^x$	B	
QR H	$m = pq$, $t \in \text{QR}$	$x \in \{0, 1\}$	$b = r^2 t^x$	H	Trapdoor \sqrt{t}