

# Robustness for Free in Unconditional Multi-Party Computation

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**Abstract.** We present a very efficient multi-party computation protocol unconditionally secure against an active adversary. The security is maximal, i.e., active corruption of up to  $t < n/3$  of the  $n$  players is tolerated. The communication complexity for securely evaluating a circuit with  $m$  multiplication gates over a finite field is  $\mathcal{O}(mn^2)$  field elements, including the communication required for simulating broadcast, but excluding some overhead costs (independent of  $m$ ) for sharing the inputs and reconstructing the outputs. This corresponds to the complexity of the best known protocols for the passive model, where the corrupted players are guaranteed not to deviate from the protocol. The complexity of our protocol may well be optimal. The constant overhead factor for robustness is small and the protocol is practical.

## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 Secure multi-party computation

Secure multi-party computation (MPC), as introduced by Yao [Yao82], allows a set of  $n$  players to compute an arbitrary agreed function of their private inputs, even if an adversary may corrupt up to  $t$  arbitrary players. Almost any distributed cryptographic protocol can be seen as a multi-party computation, and can be realized with a general MPC protocol. Multi-party computation protocols are an important building block for reducing the required trust and building secure distributed systems. While currently special-purpose protocols (e.g., for collective signing) are considered practical, this paper suggests also that general-purpose protocols may well be practical for realistic applications.

Two different notions of corruption are usually considered. A passive (or curious) adversary may only read the information stored by the corrupted players, without controlling the player's behavior. Hence only privacy of the inputs is an issue to consider, but not the correctness of the result. In contrast, an active adversary can take full control of the corrupted players. Assuring not only the privacy of the inputs, but also the correctness of the outputs (robustness) appears to entail a substantial overhead. For instance, all known protocols make (usually heavy) use of a broadcast sub-protocol for which the optimal known communication complexity is  $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ .

We briefly review the classical results on secure MPC. Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [GMW87] presented a protocol, based on cryptographic intractability assumptions, which allows  $n$  players to securely compute an arbitrary function even if an active adversary corrupts any  $t < n/2$  of the players. In the secure-channels model, where bilateral secure channels between every pair of players are assumed, Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson [BGW88] and independently Chaum, Crépeau, and Damgård [CCD88] proved that unconditional security is possible if at most  $t < n/3$  of the players are corrupted. In a model where additionally physical broadcast channels are available, unconditional security is achievable if at most  $t < n/2$  players are corrupted [RB89, Bea91b, CDD<sup>+</sup>99].

## 1.2 Previous work on efficiency

In the past, both the round complexity and the communication complexity of secure multi-party protocol were subject to many investigations: Protocols with low round complexity [BB89, BFKR90, FKN94, IK00] suffer either from an unacceptably high communication complexity (even quadratic in the number of multiplication gates), or tolerate only a very small number of cheaters.

First steps towards better communication complexity were taken by Franklin and Yung [FY92] and Gennaro, Rabin, and Rabin [GRR98], where first a private but non-resilient computation is performed (for the whole protocol in [FY92], and for a segment of the protocol in [GRR98]), and only in case of faults the computation is repeated with a slow but resilient protocol. Although this approach can improve the best-case complexity of the protocol (when no adversary is present), it cannot speed up the protocol in the presence of a malicious adversary: a single corrupted player can persistently enforce the robust but slow execution, annihilating any efficiency gain.

Recently, Hirt, Maurer, and Przydatek [HMP00] proposed a new protocol for perfectly secure multi-party computation with considerably better communication complexity than previous protocols: A set of  $n$  players can compute any function (over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}$ ) which is specified as a circuit with  $m$  multiplication gates (and any number of linear gates) by communicating  $\mathcal{O}(mn^3)$  field elements, contrasting the previously best complexity of  $\mathcal{O}(mn^6)$ . Subsequently, the same complexity was achieved by Cramer, Damgård, and Nielsen [CDN01] in the cryptographic model (where more cheaters can be tolerated).

## 1.3 Contributions

The main open question in this line of research was whether security against active cheaters can be achieved with the same communication complexity as security against passive cheaters, namely with  $\mathcal{O}(mn^2)$ . For sufficiently large circuits, we answer this question in the affirmative: The only (and unavoidable) price for robustness is a reduction in the number of tolerable cheaters ( $t < n/3$  instead of  $t < n/2$ ). The computation complexity of the new protocol is on the order of the communication complexity and hence not relevant. The achieved communication complexity of  $\mathcal{O}(mn^2)$  may well be optimal as even in the passive

model, it appears very difficult to avoid that for each multiplication gate, every player sends a value to every other player.

The new protocol uses Beaver's circuit-randomization technique [Bea91a] and the player-elimination framework from [HMP00].

## 2 Model

We consider the well-known secure-channels model as introduced in [BGW88, CCD88]: The set  $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$  of  $n$  players is connected by bilateral synchronous reliable secure channels. Broadcast channels are not assumed to be available. The goal of the protocol is to compute an agreed function, specified as an arithmetic circuit over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}$  with  $|\mathbb{F}| > n$ . The number of multiplication gates in the circuit is denoted by  $m$ . To each player  $P_i$  a unique public value  $\alpha_i \in \mathbb{F} \setminus \{0\}$  is assigned. The computation of the function is secure with respect to a computationally unbounded active adversary that is allowed to corrupt up to  $t$  of the players, where  $t$  is a given threshold with  $t < n/3$ . Once a player is corrupted, the adversary can read all his information and can make the player misbehave arbitrarily. We consider both static and adaptive adversaries, and distinguish both cases in the analysis whenever necessary. The security of our protocol is unconditional with an arbitrarily small probability of error. More precisely, there is an event that occurs with negligible probability, and as long as this event does not occur, the security of the protocol is perfect.

## 3 Protocol Overview

The protocol proceeds in two phases: In a preparation phase, which could actually be performed as a pre-computation independent of the circuit (except an upper bound on the number  $m$  of multiplication gates must be known),  $m$  random triples  $(a^{(i)}, b^{(i)}, c^{(i)})$  (for  $i = 1, \dots, m$ ) with  $c^{(i)} = a^{(i)}b^{(i)}$  are  $t$ -shared among the players. In the computation phase, the circuit is evaluated gate by gate, where for each multiplication gate one shared triple from the preparation phase is used [Bea91a].

In the preparation phase, the triples are generated in a very efficient but non-robust manner (essentially with techniques from the passive protocol of [BGW88]). The generation is divided into blocks, and after each block, the consistency of all triples in this block is verified in a single verification procedure. If a block contains inconsistent triples, this is detected with overwhelming probability, and a set of two players that accuse each other of cheating is identified and eliminated from the protocol execution. The triples from the erroneous block are of course not used. At the end of the preparation phase, we have  $m$  triples that are  $t$ -shared among the set  $\mathcal{P}' \subseteq \mathcal{P}$  of remaining players, and it will be guaranteed that the number  $t'$  of corrupted players in  $\mathcal{P}'$  is smaller than  $(|\mathcal{P}'| - t)/2$ , which is sufficient for evaluating the circuit.

In the computation stage, for every multiplication one random triple is required. Two linear combinations of the values in this triple must be reconstructed. Therefore, it is important that all triples are shared *with the same degree*  $t$  (for privacy), and that  $2t' < |\mathcal{P}'| - t$  (for reconstructibility).

The fault-localization procedure of the preparation phase is rather involved because it identifies a set of *two* players, one of whom is corrupted, whereas finding such a set of *three* players would be easy. However, eliminating a set of three players would violate the condition  $2t' < n' - t$ , and the  $t$ -shared triples would be useless.

As the underlying secret-sharing scheme we use the scheme of Shamir [Sha79], like in most threshold protocols: In order to  $t$ -share a value  $s$ , the dealer selects a random polynomial  $f$  of degree at most  $t$  with  $f(0) = s$ , and hands the share  $s_i = f(\alpha_i)$  to player  $P_i$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ . Selecting a random polynomial of degree at most  $t$  means to select  $t$  random coefficients  $a_1, \dots, a_t \in \mathbb{F}$  and to set  $f(x) = s + a_1x + \dots + a_tx^t$ . We say that a value  $s$  is  $t$ -shared among the players if there exists a polynomial  $f(x)$  of degree at most  $t$  such that  $f(0) = s$  and the share  $s_i$  held by player  $P_i$  satisfies  $s_i = f(\alpha_i)$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ . Such a  $t$ -shared value can be efficiently reconstructed by a set  $\mathcal{P}' \subseteq \mathcal{P}$  of players, as long as less than  $(|\mathcal{P}'| - t)/2$  of them misbehave (e.g., see [BW86]).

## 4 Preparation Phase

### 4.1 Overview

The goal of this phase is to generate  $m$   $t$ -shared random triples  $(a^{(i)}, b^{(i)}, c^{(i)})$  with  $c^{(i)} = a^{(i)}b^{(i)}$  in such a way that the adversary obtains no information about  $a^{(i)}$ ,  $b^{(i)}$ , and  $c^{(i)}$  (except that  $c^{(i)}$  is the product of  $a^{(i)}$  and  $b^{(i)}$ ). The generation of these triples makes extensive use of the player-elimination framework of [HMP00]:

The triples are generated in blocks of  $\ell = \lceil m/n \rceil$  triples. The triples of a block are generated (in parallel) in a non-robust manner; only at the end of the block, consistency is checked jointly for all triples of the block in a single verification procedure (*fault detection*). In case of an inconsistency, a set  $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathcal{P}$  of *two* players, at least one of whom is corrupted, is identified (*fault localization*) and excluded from further computations (*player elimination*). The triples of the failed block are discarded. Player elimination ensures that at most  $t$  blocks fail, and hence in total at most  $(n + t)$  blocks must be processed.

More precisely, the consistency verification takes place in *two* steps. In the first step (fault detection I), the degree of all involved sharings is verified. In other words, the players jointly verify that all sharings produced for generating the triples are of appropriate degree. The second verification step (fault detection II) is performed only if the first verification step is successful. Here, the players jointly verify that for every triple  $(a^{(i)}, b^{(i)}, c^{(i)})$ , every player shared the correct values such that  $c^{(i)} = a^{(i)}b^{(i)}$ . If a fault is detected (in either fault-detection step), then all triples in the actual block are discarded. Furthermore, a

set  $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathcal{P}$  of two players, one of whom is corrupted, is found (fault localization I, resp. fault localization II) and eliminated from further computations. Note that in the fault-localization procedure, the privacy of the triples is not maintained. The triples contain completely random values unrelated to all values of the actual computation.

Both verification steps use  $n$  “blinding triples”, and the privacy of these triples is annihilated in the verification procedure. Therefore, in each block,  $\ell + 2n$  triples are generated. The first verification step verifies the degree of all sharings of the first  $\ell + n$  triples, using (and destroying) the remaining  $n$  triples for blinding. The second verification step verifies the first  $\ell$  triples, using the remaining  $n$  triples for blinding. Note that the second verification step requires that the sharings of all  $\ell + n$  involved triples are verified to be correct.

During the generation of the blocks, players can be eliminated. At a given step, we denote the current set of players by  $\mathcal{P}'$ , the current number of players by  $n' = |\mathcal{P}'|$ , and the maximum number of cheaters in  $\mathcal{P}'$  by  $t'$ . Without loss of generality, we assume that  $\mathcal{P}' = \{P_1, \dots, P_{n'}\}$ . During the computation, the inequality  $2t' < n' - t$  will hold as an invariant. In the beginning,  $\mathcal{P}' = \mathcal{P}$ ,  $n' = n$ , and  $t' = t$ , and trivially  $2t' < n' - t$  is satisfied. In player elimination,  $n'$  will be decreased by 2, and  $t'$  by 1. Clearly, this preserves the invariant.

0. Set  $\mathcal{P}' = \mathcal{P}$ ,  $n' = n$ , and  $t' = t$ .

1. Repeat until  $n$  blocks (i.e.,  $n\ell \geq m$  triples) succeeded:

1.1 Generate  $\ell + 2n'$  triples (in parallel) in a non-robust manner (Sect. 4.2).

1.2 Verify the consistency of all sharings involved in the first  $\ell + n'$  triples (fault detection I, Sect. 4.3). If a fault is detected, identify a set  $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathcal{P}'$  of two players such that at least one player in  $\mathcal{D}$  is a cheater, and set  $\mathcal{P}'$  to  $\mathcal{P}' \setminus \mathcal{D}$ ,  $n'$  to  $n' - 2$  and  $t'$  to  $t' - 1$  (fault localization I).

1.3 If no fault was detected in Step 1.2, then verify that in the first  $\ell$  triples, every player shared the correct values (fault detection II, Sect. 4.4). If a fault is detected, identify a set  $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathcal{P}'$  of two players, at least one of whom is corrupted, and set  $\mathcal{P}'$  to  $\mathcal{P}' \setminus \mathcal{D}$ ,  $n'$  to  $n' - 2$  and  $t'$  to  $t' - 1$  (fault localization II).

1.4 If both verification steps were successful, then the generation of the block was successful, and the first  $\ell$  triples can be used. If either verification procedure failed, then all triples of the actual block are discarded.

## 4.2 Generate one $t$ -shared triple $(a, b, c)$

The purpose of this protocol is to generate one  $t$ -shared triple  $(a, b, c)$ , where  $c = ab$ . The generation of this triple is non-robust: verification will take place only at the end of the block. In particular, in order to share a value, the dealer simply computes the shares and sends them to the players; the consistency verification of the sent shares is delayed.

The generation of the triple is straight-forward: First, the players jointly generate  $t'$ -sharings of two random values  $a$  and  $b$ . This is achieved by having every

player share two random values, one for  $a$  and one for  $b$ , which are then summed up. Then, a  $t'$ -sharing of  $c = ab$  is computed along the lines of [BGW88,GRR98] (passive model): Every player computes the product of his share of  $a$  and his share of  $b$ . These product shares define a  $2t'$ -sharing of  $c$ , and  $c$  can be computed by Lagrange interpolation. This interpolation is a linear function on the product shares. Hence, a  $t'$ -sharing of  $c$  can be computed as a linear combination of  $t'$ -sharings of the product shares. Finally, the degrees of the sharings of  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$  must be increased from  $t'$  to  $t$ . In order to do so, the players jointly generate three random sharings of 0, each with degree  $t$ , and add one of them to the  $t'$ -sharings of  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$ , respectively. These random  $t$ -sharings of 0 are generated by first selecting a random  $t - 1$ -sharing of a random value, and then multiplying this polynomial by the monomial  $x$ .

Note that the protocol for computing a sharing of  $c = ab$  relies on the fact that the degree of the sharings of  $a$  and  $b$  is less than one third of the number of actual players, and it would not work if  $a$  and  $b$  would be shared with degree  $t$  for  $3t \geq n'$ . On the other hand, it is important that finally the sharings of *all* blocks have the same degree (otherwise the multiplication protocol of Section 5 would leak information about the factors), and  $t'$  can decrease from block to block. Therefore, first the triple is generated with degree  $t'$ , and then this degree is increased to  $t$ .

### Protocol “Generate”

We give the exact protocol for generating one  $t$ -shared triple  $(a, b, c)$ :

1. The players jointly generate  $t'$ -sharings of random values  $a$  and  $b$ :
  - 1.1 Every player  $P_i \in \mathcal{P}'$  selects two random degree- $t'$  polynomials  $\tilde{f}_i(x)$  and  $\tilde{g}_i(x)$ , and hands the shares  $\tilde{a}_{ij} = \tilde{f}_i(\alpha_j)$  and  $\tilde{b}_{ij} = \tilde{g}_i(\alpha_j)$  to player  $P_j$  for  $j = 1, \dots, n'$ .
  - 1.2 The polynomial for sharing  $a$  is  $\tilde{f}(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n'} \tilde{f}_i(x)$  (thus  $a = \tilde{f}(0)$ ), and the polynomial for sharing  $b$  is  $\tilde{g}(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n'} \tilde{g}_i(x)$  (thus  $b = \tilde{g}(0)$ ), and every player  $P_j \in \mathcal{P}'$  computes his shares of  $a$  and  $b$  as

$$\tilde{a}_j = \sum_{i=1}^{n'} \tilde{a}_{ij}, \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{b}_j = \sum_{i=1}^{n'} \tilde{b}_{ij}.$$

2. The players jointly compute a  $t'$ -sharing of  $c = ab$ :
  - 2.1 Every player  $P_i \in \mathcal{P}'$  computes his product share  $\tilde{e}_i = \tilde{a}_i \tilde{b}_i$ , and shares it among the players with the random degree- $t'$  polynomial  $\tilde{h}_i(x)$  (with  $\tilde{h}_i(0) = \tilde{e}_i$ ), i.e., sends the share  $\tilde{e}_{ij} = \tilde{h}_i(\alpha_j)$  to player  $P_j$  for  $j = 1, \dots, n'$ .
  - 2.2 Every player  $P_j$  computes his share  $\tilde{c}_j$  of  $c$  as

$$\tilde{c}_j = \sum_{i=1}^{n'} w_i \tilde{e}_{ij}, \quad \text{where } w_i = \prod_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \neq i}}^{n'} \frac{\alpha_j}{\alpha_j - \alpha_i}.$$

3. The players jointly increase the degree of the sharings of  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$  to  $t$  (this step is performed only if  $t' < t$ ):
- 3.1 Every player  $P_i \in \mathcal{P}'$  selects three polynomials  $\bar{f}_i(x)$ ,  $\bar{g}_i(x)$ ,  $\bar{h}_i(x)$  of degree  $t - 1$  at random, and sends the shares  $\bar{a}_{ij} = \bar{f}_i(\alpha_j)$ ,  $\bar{b}_{ij} = \bar{g}_i(\alpha_j)$ , and  $\bar{c}_{ij} = \bar{h}_i(\alpha_j)$  to player  $P_j$  for  $j = 1, \dots, n'$ .
  - 3.2 Every player  $P_j \in \mathcal{P}'$  computes his  $t$ -shares  $a_j$ ,  $b_j$ , and  $c_j$  of  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$ , respectively, as follows:

$$a_j = \tilde{a}_j + \alpha_j \sum_{i=1}^{n'} \bar{a}_{ij}, \quad b_j = \tilde{b}_j + \alpha_j \sum_{i=1}^{n'} \bar{b}_{ij}, \quad c_j = \tilde{c}_j + \alpha_j \sum_{i=1}^{n'} \bar{c}_{ij}.$$

### Analysis

At the end of the block, two verifications will take place: First, it will be verified that the degree of all sharings is as required ( $t'$ , respectively  $t - 1$ , Section 4.3). Second, it will be verified that in Step 2.1, every player  $P_i$  indeed shares his correct product share  $\tilde{e}_i = \tilde{a}_i \tilde{b}_i$  (Section 4.4). In the sequel, we analyze the security of the above protocol under the assumption that these two conditions are satisfied.

After Step 1, obviously the assumption that the degree of all sharings is as required immediately implies that the resulting shares  $\tilde{a}_1, \dots, \tilde{a}_{n'}$  (respectively  $\tilde{b}_1, \dots, \tilde{b}_{n'}$ ) lie on a polynomial of degree  $t'$ , and hence define a valid sharing. Furthermore, if at least one player in  $P_i \in \mathcal{P}'$  honestly selected *random* polynomials  $\tilde{f}_i(x)$  and  $\tilde{g}_i(x)$ , then  $a$  and  $b$  are random and unknown to the adversary.

In Step 2, we need the observation that  $c$  can be computed by Lagrange interpolation [GRR98]:

$$c = \sum_{i=1}^{n'} w_i \tilde{e}_i, \quad \text{where } w_i = \prod_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \neq i}}^{n'} \frac{\alpha_j}{\alpha_j - \alpha_i}.$$

Assuming that every player  $P_i$  really shares his correct product share  $\tilde{e}_i$  with a polynomial  $\tilde{h}_i(x)$  of degree  $t'$ , it follows immediately that the polynomial  $\tilde{h}(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n'} w_i \tilde{h}_i(x)$  is also of degree  $t'$ , and furthermore

$$\tilde{h}(0) = \sum_{i=1}^{n'} w_i \tilde{h}_i(0) = \sum_{i=1}^{n'} w_i \tilde{e}_i = c.$$

The privacy is guaranteed because the adversary does not obtain information about more than  $t'$  shares of any polynomial  $\tilde{h}_i(x)$  (for any  $i = 1, \dots, n'$ ).

Step 3 is only performed if  $t' < t$ . Assuming that the polynomials  $\bar{f}_i(x)$ ,  $\bar{g}_i(x)$ , and  $\bar{h}_i(x)$  of every player  $P_i \in \mathcal{P}'$  have degree at most  $t - 1$ , it immediately follows that all the polynomials defined as

$$\bar{f}(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n'} \bar{f}_i(x), \quad \bar{g}(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n'} \bar{g}_i(x), \quad \bar{h}(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n'} \bar{h}_i(x)$$

also all have degree at most  $t - 1$ . Hence, the polynomials  $x\bar{f}(x)$ ,  $x\bar{g}(x)$ , and  $x\bar{h}(x)$  have degree at most  $t$ , and they all share the secret 0. Thus, the sums  $\tilde{f}(x) + x\bar{f}(x)$ ,  $\tilde{g}(x) + x\bar{g}(x)$ , and  $\tilde{h}(x) + x\bar{h}(x)$  are of degree  $t$  and share  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$ , respectively. The privacy of the protocol is obvious for  $t' \leq t - 1$ .

We briefly analyze the communication complexity of the above protocol: Every sharing requires  $n$  field elements to be sent, and in total there are  $6n$  sharings, which results in a total of  $6n^2$  field elements to be communicated per triple.

### 4.3 Verification of the degrees of all sharings in a block

The goal of this fault-detection protocol is to verify the degree of the sharings of  $\ell + n'$  triples in a single step, using (and destroying) another  $n'$  triples.

The basic idea of this protocol is to verify the degree of a *random linear combination* of the polynomials. More precisely, every player distributes a random challenge vector of length  $\ell + n'$  with elements in  $\mathbb{F}$ , and the corresponding linear combinations of each involved polynomial is reconstructed towards the challenging player, who then checks that the resulting polynomial is of appropriate degree. In order to preserve the privacy of the involved polynomials, for each verifier one additional blinding polynomial of appropriate degree is added. If a verifier detects a fault (i.e., one of the linearly combined polynomials has too high degree), then the triples of the actual block are discarded, and in a fault-localization protocol, a set  $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathcal{P}'$  of two players, at least one of whom is corrupted, is found and eliminated.

#### Protocol “Fault-detection I”

The following steps for verifying the degree of all sharings in one block are performed in parallel, once for every verifier  $P_v \in \mathcal{P}'$ :

1. The verifier  $P_v$  selects a random vector  $[r_1, \dots, r_{\ell+n'}]$  with elements in  $\mathbb{F}$  and sends it to each player  $P_j \in \mathcal{P}'$ .
2. Every player  $P_j$  computes and sends to  $P_v$  the following corresponding linear combinations (plus the share of the blinding polynomial) for every  $i = 1, \dots, n'$ :

$$\tilde{a}_{ij}^{(\Sigma)} = \sum_{k=1}^{\ell+n'} r_k \tilde{a}_{ij}^{(k)} + \tilde{a}_{ij}^{(\ell+n'+v)} \quad \bar{a}_{ij}^{(\Sigma)} = \sum_{k=1}^{\ell+n'} r_k \bar{a}_{ij}^{(k)} + \bar{a}_{ij}^{(\ell+n'+v)}$$

$$\tilde{b}_{ij}^{(\Sigma)} = \sum_{k=1}^{\ell+n'} r_k \tilde{b}_{ij}^{(k)} + \tilde{b}_{ij}^{(\ell+n'+v)} \quad \bar{b}_{ij}^{(\Sigma)} = \sum_{k=1}^{\ell+n'} r_k \bar{b}_{ij}^{(k)} + \bar{b}_{ij}^{(\ell+n'+v)}$$

$$\tilde{c}_{ij}^{(\Sigma)} = \sum_{k=1}^{\ell+n'} r_k \tilde{c}_{ij}^{(k)} + \tilde{c}_{ij}^{(\ell+n'+v)} \quad \bar{c}_{ij}^{(\Sigma)} = \sum_{k=1}^{\ell+n'} r_k \bar{c}_{ij}^{(k)} + \bar{c}_{ij}^{(\ell+n'+v)}$$

3.  $P_v$  verifies whether for each  $i = 1, \dots, n'$ , the shares  $\tilde{a}_{i1}^{(\Sigma)}, \dots, \tilde{a}_{in'}^{(\Sigma)}$  lie on a polynomial of degree at most  $t'$ . The same verification is performed for the



- shares  $\tilde{b}_{i1}^{(\Sigma)}, \dots, \tilde{b}_{in'}^{(\Sigma)}$  and for the shares  $\tilde{c}_{i1}^{(\Sigma)}, \dots, \tilde{c}_{in'}^{(\Sigma)}$ , for  $i = 1, \dots, n'$ . Furthermore,  $P_v$  verifies whether for each  $i = 1, \dots, n'$ , the shares  $\tilde{a}_{i1}^{(\Sigma)}, \dots, \tilde{a}_{in'}^{(\Sigma)}$  lie on a polynomial of degree at most  $t-1$ . The same verification is performed for the shares  $\tilde{b}_{i1}^{(\Sigma)}, \dots, \tilde{b}_{in'}^{(\Sigma)}$  and for the shares  $\tilde{c}_{i1}^{(\Sigma)}, \dots, \tilde{c}_{in'}^{(\Sigma)}$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n'$ .
4. Finally,  $P_v$  broadcasts (using an appropriate sub-protocol) one bit according to whether all the  $6n'$  verified polynomials have degree at most  $t'$ , respectively  $t-1$  (confirmation), or at least one polynomial has too high degree (complaint).

### Protocol “Fault-localization I”

This protocol is performed if and only if at least one verifier has broadcasts a complaint in Step 4 of the above fault-detection protocol. We denote with  $P_v$  the verifier who has reported a fault. If there are several such verifiers, the one with the smallest index  $v$  is selected.

5. The verifier  $P_v$  selects one of the polynomials of too high degree and broadcasts the location of the fault, consisting of the index  $i$  and the “name” of the sharing ( $\tilde{a}$ ,  $\tilde{b}$ ,  $\tilde{c}$ ,  $\tilde{a}$ ,  $\tilde{b}$ , or  $\tilde{c}$ ). Without loss of generality, we assume that the fault was observed in the sharing  $\tilde{a}_{i1}^{(\Sigma)}, \dots, \tilde{a}_{in'}^{(\Sigma)}$ .
6. The owner  $P_i$  of this sharing (i.e., the player who acted as dealer for this sharing) sends to the verifier  $P_v$  the correct linearly combined polynomial  $\tilde{f}_i^{(\Sigma)}(x) = \sum_{k=1}^{\ell+n'} r_k \tilde{f}_i^{(k)}(x) + \tilde{f}_i^{(\ell+n'+v)}(x)$ .
7.  $P_v$  finds the (smallest) index  $j$  such that  $\tilde{a}_{ij}^{(\Sigma)}$  (received from  $P_j$  in Step 2) does not lie on the polynomial  $\tilde{f}_i^{(\Sigma)}(x)$  (received from the owner  $P_i$  in Step 6), and broadcasts  $j$  among the players in  $\mathcal{P}'$ .
8. Both  $P_i$  and  $P_j$  send the list  $\tilde{a}_{ij}^{(1)}, \dots, \tilde{a}_{ij}^{(\ell+n')}$ ,  $\tilde{a}_{ij}^{(\ell+n'+v)}$  to  $P_v$ .
9.  $P_v$  verifies that the linear combination  $[r_1, \dots, r_{\ell+n'}]$  applied to the values received from  $P_i$  is equal to  $\tilde{f}_i^{(\Sigma)}(\alpha_j)$ . Otherwise,  $P_v$  broadcasts the index  $i$ , and the set of players to be eliminated is  $\mathcal{D} = \{P_i, P_v\}$ . Analogously,  $P_v$  verifies the values received from  $P_j$  to be consistent with  $\tilde{a}_{ij}^{(\Sigma)}$  received in Step 2, and in case of failure broadcasts the index  $j$ , and  $\mathcal{D} = \{P_j, P_v\}$ .
10.  $P_v$  finds the (smallest) index  $k$  such that the values  $\tilde{a}_{ij}^{(k)}$  received from  $P_i$  and  $P_j$  differ, and broadcasts  $k$  and both values  $\tilde{a}_{ij}^{(k)}$  from  $P_i$  and  $\tilde{a}_{ij}^{(k)}$  from  $P_j$ .
11. Both  $P_i$  and  $P_j$  broadcast their value of  $\tilde{a}_{ij}^{(k)}$ .
12. If the values broadcast by  $P_i$  and  $P_j$  differ, then the localized set is  $\mathcal{D} = \{P_i, P_j\}$ . If the value broadcast by  $P_i$  differs from the value that  $P_v$  broadcast (and claimed to be the value received from  $P_i$ ), then  $\mathcal{D} = \{P_i, P_v\}$ . Else,  $\mathcal{D} = \{P_j, P_v\}$ .

### Analysis

It follows from simple algebra that if all players are honest, then the above fault-detection protocol will always pass. On the other hand, if at least one of

the involved sharings (in any of the  $\ell + n'$  triples) has too high degree, then every honest verifier will detect this fault with probability at least  $1 - 1/|\mathbb{F}|$ .

The correctness of the fault-localization protocol can be verified by inspection. There is no privacy issue; the generated triples are discarded.

The fault-detection protocol requires  $n(n(\ell + n) + 6n^2) = n^2\ell + 7n^3$  field elements to be sent and  $n$  bits to be broadcast. For fault localization, up to  $n + 2(\ell + n + 1) = 2\ell + 3n + 2$  field elements must be sent and  $2\log n + \log 6 + \log(\ell + n + 1) + 4\log |\mathbb{F}|$  bits must be broadcast.

#### 4.4 Verification that all players share the correct product shares

It remains to verify that in each triple  $k = 1, \dots, \ell$ , every player  $P_i$  shared the correct product share  $\tilde{e}_i^{(k)} = \tilde{a}_i^{(k)}\tilde{b}_i^{(k)}$  (Step 2.1 of protocol Generate). Since it is already verified that the sharings of all factor shares are of degree  $t'$ , it is sufficient to verify that the shares  $\tilde{e}_1^{(k)}, \dots, \tilde{e}_{n'}^{(k)}$  lie on a polynomial of degree at most  $2t'$ . Note that the at least  $n' - t' > 2t'$  shares of the honest players uniquely define this polynomial. The key idea of this verification protocol is the same as in the previous verification protocol: Every verifier  $P_v$  distributes a random challenge vector, and the corresponding linear combination of the polynomials (plus one blinding polynomial) is opened towards  $P_v$ . If a fault is detected, then a set  $\mathcal{D}$  of two players (one of whom is corrupted) can be found with the fault-localization protocol.

##### Protocol “Fault-detection II”

The following steps are performed for each verifier  $P_v \in \mathcal{P}'$  in parallel.

1. The verifier  $P_v$  selects a random vector  $[r_1, \dots, r_\ell]$  with elements in  $\mathbb{F}$  and sends it to each player  $P_j \in \mathcal{P}'$ .
2. Every player  $P_j$  computes and sends to  $P_v$  the following linear combinations (with blinding) for every  $i = 1, \dots, n'$ :

$$\tilde{e}_{ij}^{(\Sigma)} = \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} r_k \tilde{e}_{ij}^{(k)} + \tilde{e}_{ij}^{(\ell+v)}.$$

3.  $P_v$  verifies whether for each  $i = 1, \dots, n'$  the shares  $\tilde{e}_{i1}^{(\Sigma)}, \dots, \tilde{e}_{in'}^{(\Sigma)}$  lie on a polynomial of degree at most  $t'$ , and if so, whether the secrets  $\tilde{e}_1^{(\Sigma)}, \dots, \tilde{e}_{n'}^{(\Sigma)}$  of the above sharings (computed by interpolating the corresponding share-shares) lie on a polynomial of degree at most  $2t'$ .  $P_v$  broadcasts one bit according to whether all polynomials have appropriate degree (confirmation), or at least one polynomial has too high degree (complaint).

##### Protocol “Fault-localization II”

We denote with  $P_v$  the verifier who has reported a fault in Step 3 of the above fault-detection protocol. If there are several such verifiers, the one with the smallest index  $v$  is selected.

4. If in Step 3, the degree of one of the second-level sharings  $\tilde{e}_{i1}^{(\Sigma)}, \dots, \tilde{e}_{in'}^{(\Sigma)}$  was too high, then  $P_v$  applies error-correction to find the smallest index  $j$  such that  $\tilde{e}_{ij}^{(\Sigma)}$  must be corrected. Since all sharings have been verified to have correct degree,  $P_v$  can conclude that  $P_j$  has sent the wrong value  $\tilde{e}_{ij}^{(\Sigma)}$ .  $P_v$  broadcasts the index  $j$ , and the set of players to be eliminated is  $\mathcal{D} = \{P_j, P_v\}$  (and the following steps need not be performed).
5. Every player  $P_i$  sends to  $P_v$  all his factor shares  $\tilde{a}_i^{(1)}, \dots, \tilde{a}_i^{(\ell)}, \tilde{a}_i^{(\ell+v)}$  and  $\tilde{b}_i^{(1)}, \dots, \tilde{b}_i^{(\ell)}, \tilde{b}_i^{(\ell+v)}$ .
6.  $P_v$  verifies for every  $k = 1, \dots, \ell, \ell+v$  whether the shares  $\tilde{a}_1^{(k)}, \dots, \tilde{a}_{n'}^{(k)}$  lie on a polynomial of degree  $t'$ . If not, then  $P_v$  applies error-correction and finds and broadcasts the (smallest) index  $j$  such that  $\tilde{a}_j^{(k)}$  must be corrected. The set of players to be eliminated is  $\mathcal{D} = \{P_j, P_v\}$ . The same verification is performed for the shares  $\tilde{b}_1^{(k)}, \dots, \tilde{b}_{n'}^{(k)}$  for  $k = 1, \dots, \ell, \ell+v$ .
7.  $P_v$  verifies for every  $i = 1, \dots, n'$  whether the value  $\tilde{e}_i^\Sigma$  computed in Step 4 is correct, i.e., whether

$$\tilde{e}_i^\Sigma \stackrel{?}{=} \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} r_k \tilde{a}_i^{(k)} \tilde{b}_i^{(k)} + \tilde{a}_i^{(\ell+v)} \tilde{b}_i^{(\ell+v)}.$$

This test will fail for at least one  $i$ , and  $P_v$  broadcasts this index  $i$ . The players in  $\mathcal{D} = \{P_i, P_v\}$  are eliminated.

### Analysis

The above fault-detection protocol always passes when all players are honest. If the degree of at least one of the involved sharings is higher than  $2t'$ , then every honest verifier will detect this fault with probability at least  $1 - 1/|\mathbb{F}|$ . The correctness of the fault-localization protocol follows by inspection.

The fault-detection protocol requires  $n(n\ell + n^2) = n^2\ell + n^3$  elements to be sent, and  $n$  bits to be broadcast. The fault-localization protocol requires  $2n(\ell+1)$  field elements to be sent and  $\log n$  bits to be broadcast.

### 4.5 Error probabilities and repetitive verifications

We first calculate the probability that a static adversary can introduce a bad triple into a block, without being detected. So assume that in a block, at least one triple is bad. This is detected by every honest player with probability  $1 - 1/|\mathbb{F}|$ . Hence, the probability that no honest player detects (and reports) the inconsistency is at most  $|\mathbb{F}|^{-(n'-t')}$ . Once the bad block is detected, one corrupted player is eliminated. Hence the adversary can try  $t$  times to make pass a bad block, and the probability that (at least) one of these trials is not detected (and the protocol is disrupted) is at most  $\sum_{i=0}^{t-1} |\mathbb{F}|^{-(n-t-i)} \leq (1/|\mathbb{F}|)^{n-2t}$ .

If the adversary is adaptive, he can decide whether or not to corrupt the verifier *after* the challenge vector is known. Hence, a bad block passes the verification step if at least  $n' - t'$  of the challenge vectors cannot discover the fault, and this

happens with probability at most  $\sum_{i=0}^{t'} \binom{n'}{i} (1 - 1/|\mathbb{F}|)^i (1/|\mathbb{F}|)^{n'-i} \leq (3/|\mathbb{F}|)^{n'-t'}$ . Again, the adversary can try  $t$  times to make pass a bad block, which results in an overall error probability of  $\sum_{i=0}^{t-1} (3/|\mathbb{F}|)^{n-t-i} \leq (3/|\mathbb{F}|)^{n-2t}$ .

If the above error probabilities are too high, they can further be decreased by simply repeating the fault-detection protocols (with new and independent blinding triples). By repeating the protocol  $k$  times, the error probability is lowered to  $(1/|\mathbb{F}|)^{k(n-2t)}$  (static case), respectively  $(3/|\mathbb{F}|)^{k(n-2t)}$  (adaptive case).

## 5 Computation Phase

The evaluation of the circuit is along the lines of the protocol of [Bea91a]. Slight modifications are needed because the degree  $t$  of the sharings and the upper bound  $t'$  on the number of cheaters need not be equal. Furthermore, special focus is given to the fact that in our protocol, also eliminated players must be able to give input to and receive output from the computation.

From the preparation phase, we have  $m$  random triples  $(a^{(i)}, b^{(i)}, c^{(i)})$  with  $c^{(i)} = a^{(i)}b^{(i)}$ , where the sharings are of degree  $t$  among the set  $\mathcal{P}'$  of players. The number of corrupted players in  $\mathcal{P}'$  is at most  $t'$  with  $2t' < n' - t$ , where  $n' = |\mathcal{P}'|$ . This is sufficient for efficient computation of the circuit.

### 5.1 Input sharing

First, every player who has input secret-shares it (with degree  $t$ ) among the set  $\mathcal{P}'$  of players. We use the verifiable secret-sharing protocol of [BGW88] (with perfect security), with a slight modification to support  $t \neq t'$ . The dealer is denoted by  $P$ , and the secret to be shared by  $s$ . We do not assume that  $P \in \mathcal{P}'$  (neither  $P \in \mathcal{P}$ ).

1. The dealer  $P$  selects at random a polynomial  $f(x, y)$  of degree  $t$  in both variables, with  $p(0, 0) = s$ , and sends the polynomials  $f_i(x) = f(\alpha_i, x)$  and  $g_i(x) = p(x, \alpha_i)$  to player  $P_i$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n'$ .
2. Every player  $P_i \in \mathcal{P}'$  sends to  $P_j$  for  $j = i + 1, \dots, n'$  the values  $f_i(\alpha_j)$  and  $g_i(\alpha_j)$ .
3. Every player  $P_j$  broadcasts one bit according to whether all received values are consistent with the polynomials  $f_j(x)$  and  $g_j(x)$  (confirmation) or not (complaint).
4. If no player has broadcast a complaint, then the secret-sharing is finished, and the share of player  $P_j$  is  $f_j(0)$ . Otherwise, every player  $P_j$  who has complaint broadcasts a bit vector of length  $n'$ , where a 1-bit in position  $i$  means that one of the values received from  $P_i$  was not consistent with  $f_j(x)$  or  $g_j(x)$ . The dealer  $P$  must answer all complaints by broadcasting the correct values  $f(\alpha_i, \alpha_j)$  and  $f(\alpha_j, \alpha_i)$ .
5. Every player  $P_i$  checks whether the values broadcast by the dealer in Step 4 are consistent with his polynomials  $f_i(x)$  and  $g_i(x)$ , and broadcasts either a confirmation or an accusation. The dealer  $P$  answers every accusation by

broadcasting both polynomials  $f_i(x)$  and  $g_i(x)$  of the accusing player  $P_i$ , and  $P_i$  replaces his polynomials by the broadcast ones.

6. Every player  $P_i$  checks whether the polynomials broadcast by the dealer in Step 5 are consistent with his polynomials  $f_i(x)$  and  $g_i(x)$ , and broadcasts either a confirmation or an accusation.
7. If in Steps 5 and 6, there are in total at most  $t'$  accusations, then every player  $P_i$  takes  $f_i(0)$  as his share of  $s$ . Otherwise, clearly the dealer is faulty, and the players take a default sharing (e.g., the constant sharing of 0).

It is clear that an honest player never accuses an honest dealer. On the other hand, if there are at most  $t'$  accusations, then the polynomials of at least  $n' - 2t' > t$  honest players are consistent, and these polynomials uniquely define the polynomial  $f(x, y)$  with degree  $t$ . Hence, the polynomials of all honest players are consistent, and their shares  $f_1(0), \dots, f_{n'}(0)$  lie on a polynomial of degree  $t$ .

This protocol communicates  $3n^2$  field elements, and it broadcasts  $n$  bits (in the best case), respectively  $n^2 + 3n + 2t^2 \log |\mathbb{F}|$  bits (in the worst case).

## 5.2 Evaluation of the circuit

The circuit is evaluated gate by gate. Linear gates can be evaluated without any communication due to the linearity of the used sharing. Multiplication gates are evaluated according to [Bea91a]: Assume that the factors  $x$  and  $y$  are  $t$ -shared among the players. Furthermore, a  $t$ -shared triple  $(a, b, c)$  with  $c = ab$  is used. The product  $xy$  can be written as follows:

$$xy = ((x - a) + a)((y - b) + b) = ((x - a)(y - b)) + (x - a)b + (y - b)a + c.$$

The players in  $\mathcal{P}'$  reconstruct the differences  $d_x = x - a$  and  $d_y = y - b$ . This reconstruction is possible because  $2t' < n' - t$  (e.g., see [BW86]). Note that reconstructing these values does not give any information about  $x$  or  $y$ , because  $a$  and  $b$  are random. Then, the following equation holds:

$$xy = d_x d_y + d_x b + d_y a + c.$$

This equation is linear in  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$ , and we can compute linear combinations on shared values without communication. This means that the players can compute the above linear combination on their respective shares of  $x$  and  $y$  and they receive a  $t$ -sharing of the product  $xy$ . More details can be found in [Bea91a].

This multiplication protocol requires two secret-reconstructions per multiplication gate. Secret-reconstruction requires every player in  $\mathcal{P}'$  to send his share to every other player (who then applies error-correction to the received shares and interpolates the secret). The communication costs per multiplication gate are hence  $2n^2$ . Broadcast is not needed.

## 5.3 Output reconstruction

Any player  $P$  can receive output (not only players in  $\mathcal{P}'$  or in  $\mathcal{P}$ ). In order to reconstruct a shared value  $x$  towards player  $P$ , every player in  $\mathcal{P}'$  sends his share

of  $x$  to  $P$ , who then applies error-correction and interpolation to compute the output  $x$ . In the error-correction procedure, up to  $(n' - t - 1)/2 \geq t'$  errors can be corrected (e.g., see [BW86]).

Reconstructing one value requires  $n$  field elements of communication, and no broadcast.

## 5.4 Probabilistic functions

The presented protocol is for deterministic functions only. In order to capture probabilistic functions, one can generate one (or several) blocks with single values  $a^{(i)}$  only (with simplified verification), and use these values as shared randomness.

Alternatively, but somewhat wastefully, one just picks the value  $a^{(i)}$  from a shared triple  $(a^{(i)}, b^{(i)}, c^{(i)})$ , and discards the rest of the triple. Then,  $m$  denotes the number of multiplication gates plus the number of “randomness gates”.

## 5.5 On-going computations

In an on-going computation, inputs and outputs can be given and received at any time during the computation, not only at the beginning and at the end. Furthermore, it might even not be specified beforehand which function will be computed. An example of an on-going computation is the simulation of a fair stock market.

In contrast to the protocol of [HMP00], the proposed protocol can easily be extended to capture the scenario of on-going computations. First, the players generate  $\ell$  triples  $(a, b, c)$  with  $c = ab$ , and perform the computation until all triples are exhausted. Then, a new block of  $\ell$  triples is generated, and so on.

## 6 Complexity Analysis

A detailed complexity analysis is given in Appendix A. Here we summarize the most important results: Let  $n$  denote the number of players,  $\mathbb{F}$  the field over which the function (circuit) is defined,  $m$  the number of multiplication gates in the circuit,  $C_d$  the depth of the circuit,  $n_I$  the number of inputs and  $n_O$  the number of outputs of the function. Evaluating this circuit securely with respect to an active adversary corrupting any  $t < n/3$  of the players is possible with communicating  $14mn^2 + \mathcal{O}(n_I n^4 + n_O n + n^4)$  field elements. The number of communication rounds is  $C_d + \mathcal{O}(n^2)$ . All complexities include the costs for simulating broadcast. If the field  $\mathbb{F}$  is too small (and the resulting error probability is too high), then fault-detection protocols are repeated, and the overall communication complexity increases accordingly.

This complexity should be compared with the complexity of the most efficient protocols. In the secure-channels model, the most efficient protocol for unconditionally secure multi-party protocols [HMP00] requires  $\mathcal{O}(mn^3)$  field elements in  $\mathcal{O}(C_d + n^2)$  rounds (where both hidden constants are slightly higher than ours).

For completeness, we also compare the complexity of our protocol with the complexity of the most efficient protocol for the cryptographic model [CDN01]. This protocol requires a communication complexity of  $\mathcal{O}(mn^3)$  field elements in  $\mathcal{O}(C_in)$  rounds. The high round complexity results from the fact that the protocol invokes a broadcast sub-protocol for each multiplication gate. The most efficient broadcast protocols require  $\mathcal{O}(n)$  rounds. Constant-round broadcast protocols are known [FM88], but they have higher communication complexities and would result in a communication complexity of  $\mathcal{O}(mn^5)$  field elements.

Finally, we compare the protocol with the most efficient known protocol for passive security, namely [BGW88] with the simplification of [GRR98]. This protocol communicates  $mn^2 + \mathcal{O}(n_in + n_on)$  field elements. Hence, for large enough circuits, robustness can be achieved with a communication overhead factor of about 14.

## 7 Conclusions and Open Problems

We have presented a protocol for secure multi-party computation unconditionally secure against an active adversary which is (up to a small constant factor) as efficient as protocols with passive security. The protocol provides some (arbitrarily small) probability of error. Note that due to the player-elimination technique, this error-probability does not grow with the length of the protocol (like in all previous MPC protocols with error probability), but only in the upper bound  $t$  of the number of corrupted players.

It remains open whether quadratic complexity can also be achieved in other models. In the unconditional model with perfect security, the most efficient protocol requires communication of  $\mathcal{O}(n^3)$  field elements per multiplication gate [HMP00]. In the unconditional model with broadcast (with small error probability), the most efficient protocol requires  $\mathcal{O}(n^4)$  field elements to be broadcast per multiplication gate [CDD<sup>+</sup>99,Feh00]. In the cryptographic model (where up to  $t < n/2$  of the players may be corrupted), the most efficient protocol requires communication of  $\mathcal{O}(n^3)$  field elements (and  $\mathcal{O}(n)$  rounds!) per multiplication gate [CDN01]. A very recent result for Boolean circuits achieves essentially the same communication complexity per multiplication, but in a constant number of rounds for the whole circuit [DN01].

Also, it would be interesting to combine the techniques of this paper with the techniques of papers with protocols that require a constant number of rounds only (but have a high communication complexity), to achieve a multi-party protocol which has both low communication complexity and very low round complexity.

Furthermore, the presented protocol is for the synchronous model. Some real-world networks appear to be more appropriately modeled by the asynchronous model, and the protocol must be adapted for this setting. It seems that this can be done along the lines of [BCG93,Can95,SR00].

Finally, it would be interesting to have a proof that quadratic complexity is optimal for passive security. This would immediately imply that the protocol of this paper is optimally efficient (up to a constant factor).

## 8 Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Serge Fehr and Matthias Fitzi for many fruitful discussions, and the anonymous referees for their helpful comments.

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## A Detailed Complexity Analysis

We summarize the complexities of all involved sub-protocols. For each sub-protocol, we indicate both the message complexity (MC, in communicated field elements) and the broadcast complexity (BC, in bits) of the protocol involved once, and specify how often the protocol is called at least (when no adversary is present) and at most (when the corrupted players misbehave in the most effective way). The complexity of the verifiable secret-sharing protocol of [BGW88],

which is used for giving input, depends on whether or not some of the players misbehave. We list both complexities.

In the table,  $n$  denotes the number of players,  $t$  the upper bound on the number of actively corrupted players,  $m$  the total number of multiplication gates,  $\ell$  the number of multiplication gates per block,  $n_I$  the number of inputs to the function, and  $n_O$  the number of outputs of the function.

The indicated complexities are upper bounds: In particular, when a player has to send a message to all players, we count this as  $n$  messages (instead of  $n - 1$ ).

What	MC (field elements)	BC (bits)	#Calls (min. . . max)	
Generate triples	$6n^2$	—	$n(\ell+2n) \dots$ $(n+t)(\ell+2n)$	(1)
Fault detection I	$\ell n^2 + 7n^3$	$n$	$n \dots n+t$	(2)
Fault localization I	$2\ell + 3n + 2$	$2 \log n + 4 \log  \mathbb{F} $ $+ \log(\ell+n+1) + \log 6$	$0 \dots t$	(3)
Fault detection II	$\ell n^2 + n^3$	$n$	$n \dots n+t$	(4)
Fault localization II	$2\ell n + 2n$	$\log n$	$0 \dots t$	(5)
Give input (best)	$3n^2$	$n$	$n_I$	(6)
Give input (worst)	$3n^2$	$n^2 + 3n + 2t^2 \log  \mathbb{F} $	$n_I$	(7)
Multiply	$2n^2$	—	$m$	(8)
Get output	$n$	—	$n_O$	(9)

We add up the above complexities for  $\ell \leq m/n + 1$ ,  $n \geq 4$ , and  $t \leq n/3$ . In order to simplify the expressions, some of the terms are slightly rounded up. Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the field  $\mathbb{F}$  is large such that the resulting failure probability of the fault-detection protocols is small enough and there is no need to repeat the protocol.

In the best case (when no cheating occurs),  $10mn^2 + 22n^4 + 3n_I n^2 + n_O n$  field elements are communicated and  $2n^2 + n_I n$  bits are broadcast. Applying the broadcast protocol of [BGP89] (which communicates  $9n^2$  bits for broadcasting one bit), this results in a total complexity of less than  $10mn^2 \log |\mathbb{F}| + 22n^4(\log |\mathbb{F}| + 1) + n_I n^2(3 \log |\mathbb{F}| + 9n) + n_O n \log |\mathbb{F}|$  bits.

In the worst case, the protocol communicates  $13mn^2 + 30n^4 + 3n_I n^2 + n_O n$  field elements and broadcasts  $3n^2 + 2n \log |\mathbb{F}| + \frac{n}{3} \log m + n_I n^2 \log |\mathbb{F}|$  bits. Simulating broadcast with [BGP89], this gives less than  $14mn^2 \log |\mathbb{F}| + 35n^4(\log |\mathbb{F}| + 1) + 9n_I n^4 \log |\mathbb{F}| + n_O n \log |\mathbb{F}|$  bits. This is about  $14mn^2 + \mathcal{O}(n_I n^4 + n_O n + n^4)$  field elements.