

# Cryptographic Protocols

Spring 2021


MPC Part 5 / 2

**Model:**  $t < n/3$ , active adversary, security with abort.

**Preparation:** Generate enough random double-sharings  $[r]_{t,2t}, \dots$

## MPC Protocol

- Input:  $P_i$  wants to input  $s$ 
  1. pick next prepared double-sharing  $[r]_{t,2t}$ .
  2. reconstruct  $[r]_t$  towards  $P_i$ .
  3.  $P_i$ : broadcast  $e = s - r$ .
  4. Parties take  $[s]_t = [r]_t + e$  as sharing of input.
- Addition / Linear gates: same as passive
- Multiplication: same as passive (with actively-secure public recons.)
- Output: Use <sup>local</sup> reconstruction protocol.



## Communication

- $\mathcal{O}(n)$  fe per multiplication/output, 😊
- 1 broadcast per input.

## Preparation

- Generate enough triples  $([a], [b], [c])$  with  $a, b$  random and  $c = ab$ .

## Observation

$$\begin{aligned} \underline{x \cdot y} &= ((x - a) + a) \cdot ((y - b) + b) \\ &= (x - a)(y - b) + (x - a)\underline{b} + \underline{(y - b)a} + \underline{\frac{ab}{c}} \end{aligned}$$

## Multiplication protocol: $[x] \cdot [y]$

1. Compute and publicly reconstruct  $[u] = [x] - [a] \rightarrow u$   
and  $[v] = [y] - [b] \rightarrow v$
2. Compute  $[x \cdot y] = uv + u[b] + v[a] + [c]$ .

**Communication:** 2 public reconstructions per multiplication. 😊

**Robustness:** The protocol is robust! 😊😊

## Structure

1. **Non-Robust Computation**: Run protocol, parties can abort.
2. **Fault Detection**:  $\forall P_i$  broadcasts 1 if aborted, take OR.
3. **Fault Localization**
  - 3.1. Choose referee  $P_r$  (any party, e.g.  $P_1$ ).
  - 3.2.  $\forall P_i$ : send all random values and all received messages to  $P_r$ .
  - 3.3.  $P_r$ : identify  $P_i, P_j$  disagreeing on  $m_k$ , broadcast  $(i, j, k, m_k^{(i)}, m_k^{(j)})$ .
  - 3.4.  $P_i, P_j$ : broadcast “agree” or “accuse”.
  - 3.5. If  $P_i/P_j$  accuses, then  $E = \{P_i, P_r\} / \{P_j, P_r\}$ . Else  $E = \{P_i, P_j\}$ .
4. **Player elimination**: Eliminate  $E$ , repeat.

$$\begin{array}{l} n > n' & > n'' \\ t > t' & > t'' \end{array}$$

## Obstacles

- Additional costs  $\Rightarrow$  divide computation into  $t$  blocks.
- Secrecy  $\Rightarrow$  use player-elimination only in preparation.
- Shrinking player set  $\Rightarrow$  all sharings of fixed degree  $t$ .

## Prepare $m$ Multiplication Triples

1. Initialize  $\mathcal{P}' \leftarrow \{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$ ,  $t' \leftarrow t$ , triples  $\mathcal{T} \leftarrow \emptyset$ .
2. Repeat until  $|\mathcal{T}| \geq m$ :
  - 2.1 Non-robustly generate block  $\mathcal{B}$  of  $\ell = m/t$  triples **with degree  $t$** .
  - 2.2 On abort:  $\mathcal{P}' \leftarrow \mathcal{P}' \setminus E$ ,  $t' \leftarrow t' - 1$ , discard block.  ~~$\mathcal{B}$~~
  - 2.3 On success:  $\mathcal{T} \leftarrow \mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{B}$ .

**Communication:** At most  $t$  aborts, i.e., at most  $2m$  triples are generated.

**Invariant:** All sharings with degree  $t$  (among parties  $\mathcal{P}'$ ).

## New Problem

- Generate multiplication triples with degree  $t$ .
- Party set is  $\mathcal{P}'$  with  $|\mathcal{P}'| = n'$ ,  $t'$  corrupted, where

$$\begin{aligned} & \exists t < n. \\ & \Downarrow n-2, t-1 \end{aligned}$$

$$t + 2t' < n'$$

$[a]_t \ [b]_t \ [c]_t$  from local decons:  ~~$t$~~   $t + 1 + 2t' < n'$

## Non-Robustly Generate Block of $\ell$ Multiplication Triples

1. Generate  $\ell$  random double-sharings  $[a]_{t',t}$ .
2. Generate  $\ell$  random double-sharings  $[b]_{t',t}$ .
3. Generate  $\ell$  random double-sharings  $[r]_{t',2t'}$ .  *$t$ , not  $t'$ !*
4. Compute and publicly reconstruct  $[s]_{2t'} = [a]_{t'} \cdot [b]_{t'} - [r]_{2t'}$ .
5. Locally compute  $[c]_t = [r]_t + s$ .
6. Output triple  $([a]_t, [b]_t, [c]_t)$ . *among  $\mathcal{P}'$ , with  $|\mathcal{P}'| = n'$*

**Communication:**  $\mathcal{O}(n)$  per triple.

## Preparation

1. Initialize  $\mathcal{P}' \leftarrow \{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$ ,  $t' \leftarrow t$ , triples  $\mathcal{T} \leftarrow \emptyset$ .
2. Generate triples with degree  $t$ , in blocks of size  $\ell = m/t$ .
3. Player-Elimination, until  $t$  successful blocks.
4. Output triples  $\mathcal{T}$ , new party set  $\mathcal{P}'$ , new threshold  $t'$ .

**MPC Protocol** *parties  $\mathcal{P}'$ , with  $t'$  corruptions, all degree  $t$ , req.  $t+2t' < n$*

- Input: Pick next triple, reconstruct  $[a]_t$  to  $P_i$ , broadcast difference.
- Addition / Linear gates: same as passive.
- Multiplication: Pick next triple, reconstruct  $[x]_t - [a]_t$  and  $[y]_t - [b]_t$ .
- Output: Use reconstruction protocol.

## Communication

- $\mathcal{O}(n)$  fe per multiplication/output, 😊
- 1 broadcast per input.