Information Security and Cryptography Research Group

Byzantine Agreement Secure Against General Adversaries in the Dual Failure Model

Bernd Altmann, Matthias Fitzi, and Ueli Maurer

International Symposium on Distributed Computing — DISC '99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, vol. 1693, pp. 123–137, Sep 1999.

This paper introduces a new adversary model for Byzantine agreement and broadcast among a set P of players in which the adversary may perform two different types of player corruption: active (Byzantine) corruption and fail-corruption (crash). As a strict generalization of the results of Garay and Perry, who proved tight bounds on the maximal number of actively and fail-corrupted players, the adversary's capability is characterized by a set Z of pairs (A,F) of subsets of P where the adversary may select an arbitrary such pair (Ai,Fi) from Z and corrupt the players in Ai actively and fail-corrupt the players in Fi.

For this model we prove that the exact condition on Z for which perfectly secure agreement and broadcast are achievable is that for no three pairs (Ai,Fi), (Aj,Fj), and (Ak,Fk) in Z we have AiAjAk(FiFjFk)=P. Achievability is demonstrated by efficient protocols. Moreover, for a slightly stronger condition on Z, which covers the previous mixed (active and fail-corruption) threshold condition and the previous purely-active non-threshold condition, we demonstrate agreement and broadcast protocols that are substantially more efficient than all previous protocols for these two settings.

Key words: Broadcast, Byzantine agreement, unconditional security, active adversary, fail-corruption.

BibTeX Citation

@inproceedings{AlFiMa99,
    author       = {Bernd Altmann and Matthias Fitzi and Ueli Maurer},
    title        = {{B}yzantine Agreement Secure Against General Adversaries in the Dual Failure Model},
    editor       = {Prasad Jayanti},
    booktitle    = {International Symposium on Distributed Computing --- DISC~'99},
    pages        = {123--137},
    series       = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
    volume       = {1693},
    year         = {1999},
    month        = {9},
    publisher    = {Springer-Verlag},
}

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