Byzantine Agreement Secure Against General Adversaries in the Dual Failure Model
Bernd Altmann, Matthias Fitzi, and Ueli Maurer
International Symposium on Distributed Computing — DISC '99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, vol. 1693, pp. 123–137, Sep 1999.
This paper introduces a new adversary model for Byzantine agreement and broadcast among a set of players in which the adversary may perform two different types of player corruption: active (Byzantine) corruption and fail-corruption (crash). As a strict generalization of the results of Garay and Perry, who proved tight bounds on the maximal number of actively and fail-corrupted players, the adversary's capability is characterized by a set of pairs of subsets of where the adversary may select an arbitrary such pair from and corrupt the players in actively and fail-corrupt the players in .
For this model we prove that the exact condition on for which perfectly secure agreement and broadcast are achievable is that for no three pairs , , and in we have . Achievability is demonstrated by efficient protocols. Moreover, for a slightly stronger condition on , which covers the previous mixed (active and fail-corruption) threshold condition and the previous purely-active non-threshold condition, we demonstrate agreement and broadcast protocols that are substantially more efficient than all previous protocols for these two settings.
Key words: Broadcast, Byzantine agreement, unconditional security, active adversary, fail-corruption.
BibTeX Citation
@inproceedings{AlFiMa99,
author = {Bernd Altmann and Matthias Fitzi and Ueli Maurer},
title = {{B}yzantine Agreement Secure Against General Adversaries in the Dual Failure Model},
editor = {Prasad Jayanti},
booktitle = {International Symposium on Distributed Computing --- DISC~'99},
pages = {123--137},
series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
volume = {1693},
year = {1999},
month = {9},
publisher = {Springer-Verlag},
}