Optimal Randomizer Efficiency in the Bounded-Storage Model
Stefan Dziembowski and Ueli Maurer
Journal of Cryptology, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 5–26, Jan 2004, Conference version appeared in Proc. of STOC 2002..
In the bounded-storage model for information-theoretically secure encryption and key-agreement one can prove the security of a cipher based on the sole assumption that the adversary's storage capacity is bounded, say by bits, even if her computational power is unlimited. Assume that a random -bit string is either publicly available (e.g. the signal of a deep space radio source) or broadcast by one of the legitimate parties. If , the adversary can store only partial information about . The legitimate sender Alice and receiver Bob, sharing a short secret key initially, can therefore potentially generate a very long -bit one-time pad with about which the adversary has essentially no information.
All previous results in the bounded-storage model were partial or far from optimal, for one of the following reasons: either the secret key had to be longer than the derived one-time pad (), or had to be extremely large (), or the adversary was assumed to be able to store only actual bits of rather than arbitrary bits of information about , or the adversary received a non-negligible amount of information about .
In this paper we prove the first non-restricted security result in the bounded-storage model: is short, is very long, and needs to be only moderately larger than . In fact, can be arbitrarily close to and hence the storage bound is essentially optimal. The security can be proved also if is not uniformly random, provided that the min-entropy of is sufficiently greater than .
BibTeX Citation
@article{DziMau04a,
author = {Stefan Dziembowski and Ueli Maurer},
title = {Optimal Randomizer Efficiency in the Bounded-Storage Model},
journal = {Journal of Cryptology},
pages = {5--26},
number = {1},
volume = {17},
year = {2004},
month = {1},
note = {Conference version appeared in Proc.~of STOC 2002.},
}